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BANKRUPTCY LAW
ENFORCEABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY FORFEITURE CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL
LEASES
Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum
A proceeding pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act1 has
as its primary purpose the financial rehabilitation of the debtor.2 If he
is "insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature," 3 the debtor
may file a petition with a bankruptcy court for an arrangement.4 The
court, in its discretion, may either allow the debtor to continue in
possession of his business or appoint a receiver to carry on the operation
during the pendency of the proceeding.5 In addition, the court has the
power to stay, until final decree, the maintenance of suits against the
debtor." After having met with the approval of at least a majority of
the creditors, the proposed arrangement must be confirmed by the
court7 Upon confirmation, the plan becomes binding on general non-
111 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). This is a voluntary proceeding, resembling common
law compositions and extensions under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12,
30 Stat. 549, and the Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 74, 47 Stat. 1467, respectively. These
sections were supplanted by Chapter XI of the Chandler Act. Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840, 905. See generally J. WEINSTErN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938 (198).
2 See Nicholas v. United States, 284 U.S. 678, 687 (1966).
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act may be viewed as comprising two distinct
categories. The vast majority of proceedings (Chapters I through VII) are straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings involving the collection and distribution of all the debtor's property
and his ultimate discharge. On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Act contains other pro-
visions (Chapters VIII through XV) which contemplate the debtor's rehabilitation. Under
the latter, the debtor seeks reorganization rather than liquidation, and the creditors look
to the future earnings of the bankrupt, rather than the property held by him at the time
of suit, to satisfy their claims. See 1 W. CormR, BANKRUPTCY 0.01 (14th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as CoLLiER]. See generally Ashe, Rehabilitation Under Chapter Xl: Fact or
Fiction, 72 CoAs. L.J. 259 (1967).
3 Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
4 An arrangement is defined as "any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction,
or extension 6f the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms." Id. § 306(1),
11 U.S.C. § 706(1).
The petition seeking the arrangement must be filed in a court of bankruptcy, viz.,
one of the United States district courts or a district court of a territory or possession.
Ad. § 1(10), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10).
51d. § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (appointment of receiver or continuance of trustee in
possession); Id. § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (continuance of debtor in possession).
61d. § 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714. A debtor has no absolute right to a stay order. Stays are
discretionary, but, as they are often essential to the enforcement of the provisions of the
Act, the courts generally grant them. See In re Lieb Bros., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 229, 231
(D.N.J. 1961), citing Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 83 (1936).
7 Sections 361 and 362 of the Bankruptcy Act set forth the requirements for acceptance
of the arrangement by the creditors. Bankruptcy Act §§ 361, 262, 11 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762
(1970). Section 366 further requires that the proposed arrangement be "feasible" and "for
the best interests of the creditors." Id. § 366, 11 U.S.C. § 766.
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priority creditors and, as provided for by the arrangement plan, the
debtor is discharged from all of his unsecured debts.8
An arrangement contemplates the continued operation of the
debtor's business in the interest of rehabilitating the debtor as well as
fulfilling the expectations of his creditors. Meeting this twofold goal
becomes difficult, however, when the debtor's premises are leased and
the lessor seeks to terminate the leasehold interest by invoking a bank-
ruptcy forfeiture clause in the lease.9 Where such clauses are sufficiently
specific, they are enforceable by virtue of section 70(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 10
The Second Circuit, in Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
Blum,". was faced with the issue whether a bankruptcy court is required
to enforce a bankruptcy forfeiture clause in a commercial lease. The
district court had held that although such clauses are generally enforce-
able, the court may deny enforcement on purely equitable grounds
where, under the particular circumstances, forfeiture would be in-
equitable and contrary to the purposes of Chapter XI.12 The Second
Circuit, by a divided panel, affirmed the district court's determination. 13
In an opinion authored by Judge Timbers, the majority reasoned that
enforcement in the instant case would frustrate the legislative intent
and rehabilitative purpose of Chapter XI. 14 Although the court sub-
scribed to the general enforceability of bankruptcy clauses and limited
8 Id. § 367, 11 U.S.C. § 767. Unless the court or 'the arrangement plan itself provides
otherwise, id. § 368, 11 U.S.C. § 768, the case is dismissed upon confirmation of the arrange-
ment. The creditors, whether they have consented to the arrangement or not, are bound
by its provisions and have no further claim to the balance of the original debts.
Subsection 2 of § 367 provides that priority debts are unaffected by the confirmation.
Id. § 367(2) 11 U.S.C. § 767(2).
9 A bankruptcy clause is a standard lease provision. While there is some variation as
to the wording of the condition, such clauses usually provide for automatic termination or
termination at the option of the landlord upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
tenant. See, e.g., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300 (1945) (termination of lease upon lessee's
filing of petition in bankruptcy); In re Technical Marine Maintenance Co., 169 F.2d
548 (3d Cir. 1958) (lessor had option to terminate in event tenant should be adjudicated
a bankrupt or take advantage of any insolvency act); Jandrew v. Bouche, 29 F.2d 346
(5th Cir. 1928) (automatic termination upon transfer of the lease into the hands of the
trustee).
10 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). This section, in part, provides:
A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be assigned shall not
be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and
subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an assignment by
operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either party
shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate the
same is enforceible [sic].
11503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974).
12 In re Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp., No. 72-B-297 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1973).
13 The Second Circuit panel consisted of Judges Timbers and Moore in the majority,
and Judge Hays, dissenting.
14508 F.2d at 206-07.
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its holding to the particular circumstances of the case, 15 its decision not
to enforce the clause drastically reduces the future viability of section
70(b) of the Bankruptcy-Act. As stated by Judge Hays in his dissent, if
section 70(b) "does not apply here, it is hard to imagine a case where
it would apply."'01
In Queens Wine & Liquor, the debtor was a New York corporation
operating a retail liquor store in premises occupied under a seven-year
lease from the appellant, Carol Management Corporation. Two years
after the commencement of the term, the tenant was delinquent in
paying his rent, prompting the landlord to institute summary non-
payment proceedings. The same day, the tenant-debtor filed a petition
for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The
referee thereupon issued an order allowing the debtor to continue in
possession. Additionally, a temporary stay of all other proceedings
against the debtor's property, pending the final decree in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, was ordered. Thereafter, the debtor offered to pay
the accrued rent, subject to his obtaining a surety bond which the credi-
tors required in order to stay his adjudication as a bankrupt. 7 This
offer was initially satisfactory to the landlord. However, while the ar-
rangements for the bond were being completed, the landlord, having
received an offer to lease the premises at a higher rent, served a notice
of termination, pursuant to a bankruptcy forfeiture provision in the
lease,' 8 and petitioned the referee to vacate the stay.
After the debtor obtained the surety bond, he tendered the full
15 Id. at 207.
10 Id.
17 See Bankruptcy Act § 326, 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1970), which provides that where a
voluntary petition is filed pursuant to section 322, 11 U.S.C. § 722,
the court may, upon hearing and after notice to the debtor and to such other
persons as the court may direct, order the debtor to file a bond or undertaking,
with such sureties as the court may fix, to indemnify the estate against subsequent
loss thereto or diminution thereof ....
18 The bankruptcy provision in the lease is set out in Judge Timbers' opinion. Article
16(b) of the lease provided:
If at the date fixed as the commencement of the term of this lease or if at any
time during the term hereby demised .. . Tenant make[s] an assignment for the
benefit of creditors or petition for or enter into an arrangement this lease, at the
option of Landlord, exercised within a reasonable time after notice of the hap-
pening of any one or more of such events, may be cancelled and terminated ....
503 F.2d at 203 n.1.
The above clause was amended by a typewritten addendum:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article "16" hereof, in the event no relief is
requested in any of the bankruptcy proceedings set forth in Article "16" hereof
to disaffirm this lease, or to reform the same ... and provided, further, that all
rent, additional rent and other charges due from Tenant under the lease are paid
promptly when due, this lease shall not be terminated as provided in Article "16"
hereof, but shall continue in full force and effect.
Id. at n.2.
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amount of rent arrears. Nevertheless, Carol refused to accept the ten-
dered rent, demanding instead a surrender of the premises. The referee
ruled that although the lease was terminated as of the date of Carol's
notice of termination, the debtor should continue in possession and
pay the landlord a sum equal to the rent as compensation for use and
occupation. 19 Upon the parties' cross petitions for review, the district
court affirmed the referee's determination. 20 By this time, the debtor had
begun to operate on a profitable basis. 21 Confirmation of the arrange-
ment, which had been agreed upon by the debtor and his creditors and
which contemplated the continuation of the debtor in possession of the
premises, was adjourned pending the Second Circuit's review of the
district court's order.
Courts have generally held that bankruptcy does not sever the
landlord-tenant relationship unless otherwise expressly provided.2
Leases, if unexpired at the date of filing of a petition in bankruptcy,
are deemed "executory contracts" and as such may be assumed by the
debtor's trustee.2 3 However, to guard against insecurity of the leasehold
interest and the frequently resulting loss of control over the premises,
the landlord will usually insert a bankruptcy clause in the lease which,
under section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, shall be enforceable.24
19 In re Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp., No. 72-B-297, at A-20 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
1973).
The referee's decison was prompted by Judge Weinfeld's ruling in In re Lane Foods,
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), which affirmed a stay of a warrant of eviction
against a tenant who sought a Chapter XI arrangement. In Lane, the referee had ruled
that the tenant could remain in possession of the premises, provided he pay the landlord
compensation for use and occupancy. Although the lease had been terminated by the issu-
ance of the warrant, the district court held that where eviction would work irreparable
harm and loss to the debtor and frustrate the intent of Chapter XI, a stay was warranted
under the Bankruptcy Act. The court further stipulated, however, that this holding did
not imply that the debtor could remain in possession indefinitely, or even until the pro-
ceeding was consummated. Id. at 135-36.
20 The landlord sought immediate possession of the premises, whereas the tenant sought
a declaration that the termination clause was invalid. The district court granted the
latter's petition to the extent of determining that it would be inequitable under the
circumstances to allow forfeiture of the lease and that the debtor could continue in
possession as a tenant under the lease. In re Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp.,
No. 72-B-297 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1973).
21 The tenant's business was operating at a profit of approximately $2,000 per week,
$1,000 of which was turned over to the bankruptcy trustee. The accumulated money ex-
ceeded $50,000 and was to be applied toward the payment of debt upon confirmation of
the arrangement. 503 F.2d at 204.
22 See, e.g., In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1910); Watson v. Merrill,
136 F.-359, 363 (8th Cir. 1905); In re Newkirk Mining Co., 238 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (rejection of lease by trustee did not terminate the lease). See also 4A COLLIER, supra
note 2, at 70.44[2].
23 See R. BANKRUPTCY P. 607, modifying Bankruptcy Act § 70(b), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)
(1970). Within 30 days after qualification, the trustee must file a statement of executory
contracts assumed. Any contract, including an unexpired lease of real property, which
is not assumed within 60 days after qualification will be deemed to have been rejected.
24 See note 10 supra.
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Section 70(b), enacted in 1938,25 was merely declarative of existing
case law.26 Numerous courts had upheld the enforceability of bank-
ruptcy clauses in leases.27 In the 1945 decision in Finn v. Meighan,28 the
Supreme Court held that the forfeiture provision of section 70(b) was
applicable to reorganization proceedings under Chapter X.29 Section
302 of the Bankruptcy Act30 makes the provision equally applicable to
Chapter XI proceedings. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, for-
feiture provisions are disfavored by the law.31 If such clauses are to be
enforced in the bankruptcy context, they must be explicit;82 for where
the language employed is ambiguous, the provision will be construed
in a light most favorable to the tenant-debtor.33
25 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 880.
28 See 4A CoLLmR, supra note 2 at 70.03[3]. This section was inserted in the Bank-
ruptcy Act merely "to round out and make comprehensive the provision dealing with
unexpired leases." J. WmNSTmN, BANKRUrrCY LAW OF 1938, at 159 (1988).
27 See, e.g., In re Walker, 93 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1937) (landlord allowed to terminate
lease where court order continuing debtor in possession, in effect, made the debtor a
"receiver" within the meaning of the bankruptcy clause in the lease); Model Dairy Co.
v. Foltis-Fischer, Inc., 67 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1933) (court held lessor entitled to evict
tenant where appointment of a receiver was breach of bankruptcy clause); Jandrew v.
Bouche, 29 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1928) (lease was terminated by the tenant's adjudication as
a bankrupt and the subsequent appointment of a trustee according to the conditional
limitation in the lease); Empress Theatre Co. v. Horton, 266 F. 657 (8th Cir. 1920) (lease
provision providing for termination of leasehold interest upon insolvency or bankruptcy
of lessee enforced against debtor's trustee in bankruptcy); In re Scholtz-Mutual Drug Co.,
298 F. 589 (D. Colo. 1924) (forfeiture enforced against tenant who was held in breach of
lease provision when bankruptcy petition was filed against him).
28 825 U.S. B00 (1945).
20 Affirming the Second Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the lease in
question was effectively terminated, pursuant to its forfeiture provision, by the tenant's
petition for reorganization under Chapter X. The debtor's trustee was directed to sur-
render possession to the landlord. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated
that Congress had made § 70(b) applicable to Chapter X proceedings by virtue of § 102
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970). 325 U.S. at 302. Section 102 states that other
chapters should be applicable "insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the
provisions" of Chapter X. Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970). Justice Douglas
further declared: "That being the policy adopted by Congress, our duty is to enforce it."
325 U.S. at 303. Accord, In re Technical Marine Maintenance Co., 169 F.2d 548 (3d
Cir. 1948).
30 Bankruptcy Act § 302, 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Section 302 provides, inter alia, that
"[t]he provisions of chapters I to 7 of this title shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent
with or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter, apply in proceedings under this
chapter." See Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954); In re
Burke, 76 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
81 "Forfeitures are not favored either at law or in equity." In re Clerc Chem. Corp.,
52 F. Supp. 109, 110 (D.N.J. 1943), aff"d, 142 F.2d 672 (3d Cir. 1944), citing In re Larkey,
214 F. 867 (D.N.J. 1914).
32 Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act specifies that an "express" covenant is en-
forceable. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
33 Courts very often have strained to interpret forfeiture clauses narrowly, or to find
them insufficiently "express" within the meaning of the federal statute. See, e.g., In re
Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 680, 683 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
946 (1970); In re Clerc Chem. Corp., 142 F.2d 672, 674 (3d Cir. 1944); Urban Properties
Corp. v. Benson, Inc., 116 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1940) (dissenting opinion); In re Burke, 76
F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1948). See also 4A Co.LIER, supra note 2, at 70.44[3].
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Yet, even where a forfeiture clause has been found valid and en-
forceable on its face, courts have created two exceptions to alleviate the
potentially harsh consequences of what otherwise would be the man-
datory application of section 70(b). The traditional exception is waiver
and estoppel, which has been applied by several federal courts of appeals
to avoid an unjust forfeiture of a tenant's lease.84 Thus, where the lessor
has engaged in some form of conduct evincing an intent to affirm the
tenancy, he will be deemed to have waived his right to terminate the
lease and be estopped from asserting its forfeiture. Typical conduct by
a landlord which constitutes a waiver is the acceptance of rent,85 or an
unreasonable delay in giving notice of termination. 6 At least one court
has invoked the waiver doctrine in the face of a lease containing a
conditional limitation that, upon the occurrence of the condition, the
lease shall automatically terminate without any notice or action by the
landlord.8 7
The majority in Queens Wine & Liquor felt constrained to affirm
the joint findings of the district court and the referee that there was no
waiver.88 However, the court acknowledged that the landlord's initial
concern solely with the overdue rent, and the tenant's subsequent re-
liance on the landlord's apparent intention not to pursue eviction if he
84 See cases cited in notes 35-37 infra.
86 See B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 338 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964) (landlord's accep-
tance of two checks for rent after the petition was filed constituted waiver); Ten-Six
Olive, Inc. v. Curby, 208 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953) (acceptance of six monthly payments, in
accordance with lease, from the reorganization trustee and later the trustee in bankruptcy,
constituted a waiver of the right to terminate).
86 See, e.g., Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954) (landlord's
right to terminate waived and intention to affirm tenancy inferred from his seven-month
delay before electing to cancel the lease).
87 See Atwell Bldg. Corp. v. Sound, Inc., 171 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
962 (1948), wherein the clause in the lease provided that the tenant's filing of a petition in
bankruptcy would constitute a breach and automatic termination of the lease. The land-
lord contended that this was a conditional limitation and, therefore, could not be waived.
The court rejected this argument, holding that where the landlord elected to acknowledge
the continued existence of the lease, he was bound whether the lease provision was a
condition or a conditional limitation.
Although the Second Circuit refers to the lease provision in Queens Wine & Liquor
as a conditional limitation, it is more accurately termed a condition. The technical dis-
tinction between the two is that the latter requires an affirmative act on the part of the
lessor, whereas the former provides for automatic termination upon the occurrence of the
condition. 1 H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12(d),(e), at 68-72 (1912). Although ves-
tiges of the distinction are still found in some decisions, for the most part, the technicality
is now ignored by the courts. Judge Judd, in the district court, easily disposed of the issue,
reasoning that "[t]he equitable power of a bankruptcy court should not depend on the
vagaries of ancient nomenclature." In re Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp., No. 72-
B-297 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1973).
38 503 F.2d at 205. Concurrent findings of fact by a referee and the district court may
not be set aside unless they are "dearly erroneous." In re Simon v. Agar, 299 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
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received the rent, lent weight to the tenant's estoppel argument. 9
Nevertheless, the court refused to rest its decision on this ground, in
deference to the more flexible rationale that the lease provision was
unenforceable due to "compelling equitable and policy considera-
tions." 40
This additional, far more novel and liberal exception to the en-
forcement of valid forfeiture clauses was created by the Third and
Fourth Circuits, respectively, in In re Fleetwood Motel Corp.41 and
Weaver v. Hutson.42 In these cases, the courts, looking beyond the ob-
jective validity of the forfeiture clauses and the conduct of the parties,
viewed the effects enforcement would have on the debtor and the public.
Each case arose in the context of Chapter X reorganization proceed-
ings4" and the courts therein held that enforcement of the forfeiture
provisions under the circumstances would frustrate the reorganization
aims of Chapter X. Both circuits held that, as courts of equity, they had
the power and discretion to disallow forfeiture where it would be in-
equitable and contrary to the public interest.44
Fleetwood involved the reorganization of a publicly owned hotel
corporation. The tenant-corporation leased, for a term of 99 years, cer-
tain premises upon which it constructed a motel complex. According to
the lease provisions, upon termination of the lease, the tenant was
required to deliver not only the premises but all the improvements
thereon. The lease also contained a bankruptcy clause similar to the
one in Queens Wine & Liquor. Upon the tenant's filing of a petition
for Chapter X reorganization, the landlord45 attempted to invoke the
forfeiture provision and regain possession of the property. The unani-
mous court of appeals panel declared that, since reorganization would
be futile if the property were forfeited, enforcement of the provision
9 Carol's conduct prior to the notice of termination indicated a willingness to forgive
the tenant's default and permit the tenancy to continue, provided the debtor tender all
rent arrears. Even after the termination notice had been served and a stay ordered by
the referee, Carol sent a letter to the tenant indicating full awareness of its right to
terminate but refraining from so doing. At a subsequent hearing on the debtor's appli-
cation to continue in possession, the lessor merely requested that either the stay be lifted
or that the money be paid. In reliance on the landlord's behavior, the debtor, his creditors,
and their attorneys worked to formulate a satisfactory arrangement plan. 503 F.2d at 205.
40 Id. at 206.
41235 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
42459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1972).
43 Bankruptcy Act, ch. X, 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).
44In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1964); Weaver v. Hutson,
459 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1972).
45 The petition was filed by Joseph F. Bradway and Bernard W. Capaldi as trustees,
representing various persons having an interest in the leasehold property. To avoid con-
fusion with the trustees of the debtor-tenant, the court referred to these parties in interest
as the "landlord." See 335 F.2d at 859 n.l.
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in this case would frustrate the aims of Chapter X and seriously impair
the rights of the investing public. 46 Furthermore, forfeiture of the lease
would result in a windfall to the landlord, who would thereby acquire
the motel and its fixtures, the corporation's only assets.
Under strikingly similar facts, the Fourth Circuit, in Weaver,
unanimously adopted the. reasoning of the Fleetwood court. Here too,
the case involved the Chapter X reorganization of a hotel corporation.
When three debenture holders of the corporation filed a Chapter X
petition as creditors, 47 the landlords sought to have the lease declared
forfeited. The court held that "the Landlords' insistence upon a for-
feiture was highly unconscionable and inequitable in the circum-
stances- a demand for blood." 48 Insofar as all the debtor's property
would revert to the landlords if the lease were forfeited, reorganization
would become moot.49
In reaching their decisions, both the Weaver and Fleetwood courts
relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Hoboken
R.R.50 Smith involved a railroad reorganization under section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act,5 ' thus raising important considerations under the
Interstate Commerce Act.52 It is the function of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under section 77 to prepare a plan for reorganization of the
debtor that is fair and equitable and "compatible with the public
interest."5 83 Continued operation by a carrier is of primary importance
to its security holders as well as to the public. The Smith Court found
that "[i]f forfeiture of the lease [were] ... declared, no plan of reorgani-
zation [would] be possible."5 4 Consequently, the Court stayed effectu-
ation of the bankruptcy clause in the railroad's lease, pending the
Commission's plan for reorganization. 5
Conceding that there were factual differences between Weaver,
46 335 F.2d at 862. The public shareholders, represented by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in this proceeding, had invested over $500,000 in the debtor corpo-
ration. Id.
47 Not only a debtor corporation, but also "three or more creditors who have claims
against the corporation or its property" or "an indenture trustee" may file a petition
under Chapter X. Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
48 459 F.2d at 745.
49 Id. at 744.
50 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
51 Bankruptcy Act § 77, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). This comprehensive section governs
the reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce.
52 Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Congress intended in the Act to
carry out a national transportation policy of fair and impartial regulation of interstate
commerce. See Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 899.
58 Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970).
54 328 U.S. at 131-32.
55 Id. at 133.
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Fleetwood, and the instant case, the Queens Wine & Liquor majority
nevertheless found the rationale of those cases compelling. However,
Queens Wine & Liquor is not only factually dissimilar to the cases re-
lied upon, but clearly distinguishable. The most obvious distinction is
that Fleetwood and Weaver arose in the context of Chapter X reorgani-
zation proceedings whereas Queens Wine & Liquor involved a Chapter
XI arrangement. The majority barely made note of this difference,
except to assert that since both chapters contemplate the rehabilitation
of the debtor, the relevancy of the cases was unimpaired.56 Chapters X
and XI are mutually exclusive rehabilitative provisions, 7 embodying
distinct schemes of reorganization. Chapter X contemplates the re-
organization of corporations with complicated debt structures and a
large number of stockholders, whereas Chapter XI is designed for small
businesses and corporations with few stockholders.58 While a plan under
Chapter X may alter the status of a number of classes of investors and
creditors, a Chapter XI arrangement involves only the rights of un-
secured creditors of the debtor.5 9 The debtor is in almost complete con-
trol of a Chapter XI arrangement. Chapter X plans, however, are subject
to pervasive judicial control and, in addition, are supervised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to protect the interests of public
investors.60
Moreover, the equitable and policy considerations present in
Queens Wine & Liquor were considerably attenuated from those which
concerned the Fleetwood and Weaver courts. Fleetwood and Weaver
involved the interests of public shareholders, and the regulatory activ-
ities of the Securities and Exchange Commission.61 While the interests
GO 503 F.2d at 205 n.6.
57 Chapters X and XI "are not alternate routes, the choice of which is in the hands
of the debtor." SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 879 U.S. 594, 607 (1965). A debtor
may only resort to Chapter X if he is unable to obtain adequate relief under Chapter XI;
similarly, the court will dismiss a Chapter XI petition if it should have been brought
under Chapter X. Id.
68 SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 447 (1940).
59 Id. at 452. See note 4 supra.
60 See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1965), wherein the
Court remarked:
The contrast between the provisions of Chapter X, carefully designed to protect
the creditor and stockholder interests involved, and the summary provisions of
Chapter XI is quite marked. The formulation of the plan of arrangement, and
indeed the entire Chapter XI proceeding, for all practical purposes is in the
hands of the debtor, subject only to the requisite content of a majority in number
and amount of unsecured creditors ...
61 Authority for consideration of the effect of a forfeiture clause on the interests of
the public was derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Hoboken R.R., 828
U.S. 123 (1946). Concerned with maintaining a satisfactory system of transportation, the
Court sought to foster the interests of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the railroad's
security holders, and the general public. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text supra.
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of general creditors are important considerations in any bankruptcy
proceeding, the majority's contention that the trade creditors and pri-
vate investors of the tenant-debtor in Queens Wine & Liquor "stand on
no less significant a footing than did the shareholders of the debtors in
Weaver and Fleetwood"6 2 is dubious. Unlike most shareholders, trade
creditors generally exercise substantial control over their investments
and certainly possess a keen awareness of the debtor's financial con-
dition.63 Thus, while considerations of equity and public policy are
appropriate where innocent stockholders are involved, such considera-
tions are entitled to less weight where the affected parties are trade
creditors who, despite their current knowledge of the debtor's financial
situation, choose to continue their business dealings with the debtor.
Furthermore, reorganization of the hotel corporations in Fleetwood
and Weaver would have been totally emasculated by forfeiture since
the result would have been deprivation of the debtors' entire assets.
In addition, the landlord in each case would have realized a windfall
acquisition of the debtor's improvements to the property. In Queens
Wine & Liquor, by contrast, the debtor's potential loss was small. While
location is admittedly an important asset to any retail establishment, this
factor was overly magnified by the majority for purposes of a strained
comparison between the two forfeiture situations. The landlord in
Queens Wine & Liquor merely sought to obtain, by enforcement of the
forfeiture provision, possession of his own property.64 Judge Timbers
drew an unconvincing analogy in characterizing as a windfall the in-
creased rent that the landlord could earn by re-letting the premises.65
It was natural for the landlord to attempt to re-let the property at the
maximum rent the current market would bear.
The Second Circuit's decision in Queens Wine &- Liquor creates
uncertainty for the landlord as to the future efficacy of including a
bankruptcy forfeiture clause in a commercial lease. Although the court
limited its holding to the facts of the case, the circumstances were not
62 503 F.2d at 207.
63 See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 549, 613-14 (1965), where the
Court observed:
Public investors are ...generally widely scattered and are far less likely than
trade creditors to be aware of the financial condition and cause of the collapse of
the debtor. They are less commonly organized in groups or committees capable
of protecting their interests.
64 The majority in Queens Wine & Liquor acknowledged the fact that forfeiture of the
lease would have enabled the landlords in Fleetwood and Weaver to acquire substantial
"tenant assets." 503 F.2d at 206 (emphasis in original). They nevertheless failed to recognize
that this difference in benefit to the landlord merited a distinction and found the rationale
of these cases to be applicable. Id.
65 Id.
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so unique as to prevent the average retail establishment from availing
itself of this precedent to circumvent the intended effect of such a
provision. If the court felt so constrained by the equities involved to
disallow forfeiture in this case, it could have reached the same result by
resting its decision on the much less controversial ground of estoppel.66
It is possible that the majority in Queens Wine & Liquor might
well have been anticipating the ultimate legislative demise of section
70(b). The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 67 which is, in effect, a
total revision of the present Act, provides that if defaults in prior per-
formance are cured, a bankruptcy clause in a lease shall not be enforce-
able in a rehabilitation proceeding.68 The Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States, which authored the bill, has recognized
that reservation of the right to terminate a lease in the event of a filing
of a petition in bankruptcy "is often tantamount to giving [the lessor] a
veto on any plan of reorganization without regard to the viability of
a reorganization plan and the interests of the creditors." 69
Although restraining the lessor, the approach of the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act is appealing since it provides appropriate safeguards
to insure that the lessor's interests are adequately protected. Under the
revised Act, all business rehabilitation provisions presently contained
in Chapters X, XI, and XII are combined into one chapter.70 The filing
of a petition by the debtor works an automatic stay of the commence-
ment of any civil actions against him '1 However, the Act further pro-
vides that the lessor may file a complaint to terminate or modify the
stay, thereby placing upon the debtor the burden of proving that the
value of the lessor's interest in the leased property is properly secured.72
In a situation such as that presented in Queens Wine & Liquor, the
debtor would be free from the immediate threat of loss of property
06 See note 39 supra.
67 See REORr OF THE COMIUSSION ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as CosnZnsssON REPORT].
The Report is divided into parts. Part I contains the findings of the Commission; part Ii
contains the proposed bill and the Commission's notes. See generally Coogan, The Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions For the Non-Bankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus.
LIAW. 729 (1974).
The bill has been introduced in both Houses of Congress. Proposed Bankruptcy
Act of 1973, S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Bankruptcy Act].
68 Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 67, at § 4-602(b)(2).
69 COanSSION REPORT, supra note 67, pt. 1, at 16.
70 Since the three chapters under the present Act contain many overlapping rules and
there is frequent wasteful litigation regarding the applicability of a given chapter to a
particular case, the Commission found that it would be more effective to deal with the
rehabilitation of business debtors in one chapter. Id. at 23.
71 Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 67, at § 4-501.
72 Id. § 7.2o3(b).
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essential to his arrangement with his creditors. In the event, however,
that the ultimate rehabilitation of the debtor became suspect, the land-
lord would be able to secure adequate assurance of future performance,
modification of the stay with the imposition of conditions to adequately
protect his interest, or in the alternative, termination of the stay and
eventual dispossession." The procedure outlined by the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act would provide a basis upon which a court could make
a flexible response to both policy considerations and the legitimate
needs of the lessor. With the passage of the Act, courts would no longer
have to strain to avoid the strict requirements of the current section
70(b).
Joanne Welty
73 Id.
